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is the simple, matter-of-fact tale that Plutarch tells, possessing, you may think, no special hint of priestly craft up to *this* point, at any rate. For it is surely open to us to explain the phenomenon precisely as we should the similar one today when a log on the hearth that is apparently extinct suddenly exhibits a vital flame. The context, however, may make a questioning reader pause and ponder; for immediately before this narrative we have the statement that Cicero's reputation with the populace for courage and decision was none of the best, while, immediately after, we find an exactly opposite characterization of his wife Terentia. Plutarch says that she was neither tender-hearted nor timid, but, on the contrary, a woman keen for distinction, who, according to her own husband's description of her, was much more eager to claim a share in his thoughts on politics than communicate her own to him on household matters. On this occasion, she went straight to him with the news, as she had been bidden, and spurred him against the conspirators. So we may ask ourselves the questions: Did Vesta really intervene at a crucial time in Rome's history, and quicken a dead fire miraculously, or, to use modern language, did Dame Nature chance to play a freakish trick at just the opportune moment, or shall we rather say that virginal hands with patriotic motives craftily resurrected the flame in a way that was known to them alone? This last explanation is, to my way of thinking, more than a remote possibility.

We should bear in mind that no one in Rome had more imperative reasons to acquaint himself with the ways of fire than those very priestesses; for we are told that if they let the sacred flame die on Vesta's hearth, they might be severely scourged by the Pontifex Maximus, until they were convinced, like the school boy of fifty years ago, that some of the fire that Prometheus stole from heaven still lurks in the cane in which he once concealed it. No wonder that the young novice who had been taking her lessons from the senior vestal Aemilia, as Valerius Maximus<sup>40</sup> tells us, and had chanced to let the sacred fire go out, was tempted to practice a miracle to escape the severe punishment that might be meted out to her. Having first paid reverence to the goddess whom she served, she placed a very fine linen sheet which she owned upon the hearth, and lo! suddenly the fire broke forth. By Vesta's intervention she evaded all blame. Of course, under cover of that sheet, it would have taken but little sleight of hand to drop a highly inflammable substance in the warm ashes, and but slight movement of the cloth to fan a new-born flame to respectable size.

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<sup>40</sup> 1.1.7.

## REVIEWS

The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive: A Quest. By Edward A. Sonnenschein. London: John Murray (1910). 60 pp.

The theory of the Latin subjunctive which, for the last half-century, has enjoyed the widest acceptance may be stated as follows: The Latin subjunctive is formally a fusion of two Indo-European moods, the subjunctive and the optative. The Indo-European subjunctive had two broad general forces. First, it was volitive, the mood of will; secondly, it denoted futurity, pure and simple. The Indo-European optative was, first, the mood of wish; secondly, it was a potential, expressing the notions conveyed by our auxiliaries, 'should', 'would', 'may'. Latin, as a fusion of these two Indo-European moods, is held to have inherited at least three of the four notions above enumerated—the volitive, the wish, and the potential uses. As I aimed to show in Volume I of my *Syntax of Early Latin*, this theory admirably fits the facts of the Latin language, accounting for the use of the subjunctive not only in principal sentences but in subordinate clauses as well.

The book of Professor Sonnenschein, who fills the chair of Classics at Birmingham, challenges the view above stated and seeks to supplant it with a new one. To his mind, the Latin subjunctive possessed not several functions but one. It was the mood of "non-ethical obligation". From this fundamental force he endeavors to explain all the uses familiar to us in Latin syntax. While he approaches his task with a competent knowledge of the extensive literature of his subject, while he argues his cause with a frank recognition of many of the difficulties likely to be urged against his views and defends his own position with admirable skill and acuteness, yet I am not persuaded that his interesting brochure will win many converts to the new doctrine.

The author takes up at the outset the objection that the Latin subjunctive might naturally be expected to have contained different basal meanings as a result of its composite origin—Indo-European subjunctive and optative. To this objection, he urges that there is no *a priori* reason why the Indo-European subjunctive and optative were not identical in function, precisely as in Greek the long vowel and the short vowel subjunctives and the first and the second aorist are equivalent in function. He admits that in Greek, though not invariably even here, subjunctive and optative are sharply differentiated. But he suggests that this distinction, which is shared also by the Sanskrit, may be purely the result of a primitive Greco-Indian unity. For Indo-European, Sonnenschein holds that subjunctive and optative alike expressed primarily this notion of non-ethical obligation.

It is of course obvious that actual instances of Latin subjunctives denoting obligation are not nu-

merous. We have two recognized types of the usage: interrogative expressions like *hunc hominem non defendam, non diligam? cur abeam?* and imperfects like *haec mihi praediceres*, 'you ought to have told me this beforehand'; *haec tale ne faceres*, 'you ought not to have done such a thing'. These, however, are infrequent and have long since been adequately explained as psychologically natural developments of the volitive use of the mood. It is doubtless from an appreciation of the paucity of subjunctives denoting obligation that the author endeavors to augment their number by interpreting as subjunctives of obligation certain examples ordinarily otherwise explained. A typical instance is Plautus, *Trinummus* 496, *ubi mortuos sis, ita sis ut nomen cluet*, which Sonnenschein translates, 'when you are dead, you are bound to be dead'. In view of the extreme unnaturalness of the English, it is difficult to subject to fair criticism a rendering like this. But I think it unlikely that the average student will recognize in the passage a notion of obligation, either ethical or non-ethical, either natural or logical. In my *Syntax of Early Latin*, Vol. I, 200 ff., I have considered at some length the example just cited, along with many others of the same sort, and venture to call attention to my own explanation. To my mind, *sis* in the *Trinummus* passage is merely a faded out 'would' potential. Another typical example of the same usage is Miles Gloriosus 689, *hoc numquam audias*, literally, 'you would never hear', but virtually 'you never hear'. So Most. 148, *nec quisquam esse auxilio queat*, literally, 'no one would be able', but in reality 'no one can'; And. 460, *fidelem haud ferme mulieri invenias virum*, 'you would scarcely find', i.e. 'you scarcely ever find'; Cato, *De Agricultura* 17.1, *id semen legere possis* = 'you can gather'. In the work cited I have given no fewer than forty examples of precisely this kind. Scotch English in particular abounds in similar instances of this use of the 'should', 'would' potential with the value of the indicative, e.g. 'How old would he be?' 'He'd be five and forty'. So also in Sanskrit and Greek we find the same use of the potential; see Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax*, 2. 371; Blase, *Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache*, 3.123. Compare also the German, *ich wüsste nicht* = *ich weiss nicht*. Professor Sonnenschein has himself seemed to recognize this transition in another connection. On page 46, speaking of the 'should' 'would' potential, he says: "in proportion as this shadow cast by the condition becomes light, the expression of what *would be* approaches to an expression of what *will be*". He has himself, therefore, made easy for us the interpretation of the *Trinummus* passage which I suggest in my *Early Latin Syntax*, 'when you have died, you are dead indeed'. See page 200 for numerous convincing examples of the same kind. I must leave it to the judgment of the reader whether Sonnenschein's in-

terpretation of these same passages (so far as he cites them) is a natural one. To me it seems invariably very forced. Thus he translates Terence, *Adelphoe* 254, *abs quivis homine, quom est opus, beneficium accipere gaudeas*, by 'one cannot but rejoice'. In this last example one seeks in vain for any notion of obligation either in the Latin or in the English. Sonnenschein's rendering, to my mind, expresses necessity (a different thing from obligation, natural, moral, or logical—Sonnenschein's three divisions). But the Latin, I feel, expresses neither necessity nor obligation—it gives merely a general statement of fact, 'one rejoices'.

The author's attempts to derive from the notion of obligation the various well-known and frequently exemplified uses of the subjunctive are most unsatisfactory. Thus he tells us that *vendam* = 'I am to sell'; *vendas* = 'you are to sell'; *vendat* = 'he is to sell'. But 'I am to sell', etc., do not denote obligation. Nor is it easy to see how the notion of obligation could develop the notion which we call volitive, i.e. how 'you ought to go' can develop the meaning 'go!' Again Terence, *Hautontimorumenos* 273, *mane! hoc quod coepi primum enarrem*, conveys to my mind a very strong notion of resolve, 'I'm determined to finish telling'.

Similarly the development of the wish idea from that of obligation seems to me an incredible process. For the present subjunctive in this use Sonnenschein can cite nothing stronger than the German analogue *er soll leben* = *vivat*, the psychology of which is not clear. For the past tense the Greek *ᾧπελον εἴθε* shows how a past expression of obligation might come to designate an unrealized desire.

Coming to the 'may' and 'can' potentials we find the gerundive cited in support of the possibility of a transition from the notion of obligation to that of possibility, e.g. *homo non ferendus*. But it is only in combination with a negative that the gerundive develops the 'can' notion. For affirmative sentences we have nothing either in logic or in usage to support the development.

Even less convincing are the explanations proposed for the origin of the subordinate uses of the subjunctive. Thus Plautus, *Amphitruo* 985, *nec quisquam tam audax fuat homo qui obviam obsistat mihi*, is translated, 'no one would be so bold that he shall stand', in illustration of the origin of the result clause. But I am at a loss to detect here any notion of obligation either in the Latin or the English 'shall', which seems to me to convey the notion of futurity merely and which moreover fails to bring out the real idea of the Latin—'so bold as to stand'. A similar arbitrary rendering of examples follows on page 37. So far as I can see, no one of these remotely contains any notion of obligation. I feel constrained to maintain this, despite the author's plea that the 'shall' of his translations is not a 'shall' of futurity.

Other types of subordinate clauses considered by Professor Sonnenschein are conditional sentences and the *cum*-constructions. If we follow him, we are to believe that in a sentence like *si mihi obviam veniat, eum verberem*, 'if he should come my way, I should beat him', the *verberem* "contains the idea of *ought* . . . marking the conclusion as the necessary consequences of the premises"! The way in which the force of the protasis in 'should' 'would' conditions is deduced is no less fanciful and unnatural.

In discussing the origin of the *cum*-constructions, the author fails entirely to explain how it is that *quom* took the indicative up to Cicero's time and then began to be construed with the subjunctive. By the terms of Sonnenschein's theory, we should naturally believe that *cum Athenis essem* started out with the meaning, 'when it was my duty to be at Athens', which then somehow came to mean, 'when I was in Athens'.

On the whole, Professor Sonnenschein's theory makes extreme demands on our credulity. If obligation was the basal meaning of the subjunctive and optative in Indo-European, why is it that clear instances of the usage do not abound on every hand? Why do we not find *veniam*, 'I ought to come'; *credamus*, 'we ought to believe', etc.? Sonnenschein in his explanations of development freely *assumes* these meanings (e.g. in the apodosis of conditional sentences, as *laeter*, 'I ought to rejoice'); but outside of imperfects (e.g. *praediceret*) and interrogative sentences (e.g. *cur abeam?*), where do we actually find these meanings in the Latin subjunctive? They simply do not exist.

Again, if the basal meaning of the Indo-European subjunctive and optative was that of obligation, why is it that we find no trace whatever of this force in the Greek and the Sanskrit subjunctive or in the Greek and Sanskrit optative? Can it be possible that the basal meaning of two moods disappeared absolutely in two languages whose oldest literatures are so well preserved for us? Nor can I find that a single other Indo-European language exhibits traces of the obligation idea, although Iranian has both subjunctive and optative, while Germanic, Slavic, and Celtic have either subjunctive or optative. Such a state of affairs, I repeat, is nothing less than incredible, if Sonnenschein's theory were true.

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From Religion to Philosophy. A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation. By Francis M. Cornford. London: Arnold (1912). Pp. xx + 276.

"Among all peoples", says Pfeiderer, "the earliest speculations have been of a religious nature, and from these, in general, philosophy took its rise". It could scarcely be otherwise, for, as Professor Nash

has put it, the religious question shares with the food question and the sex question alone the distinction of having vitally interested all sorts and conditions of men from the beginning of historic time.

In his position that the direction taken by the philosophical views of the Greeks was very largely influenced by the religious conceptions that were current before the rise of philosophy, Mr. Cornford is, accordingly, advancing neither a novel nor a startling view. Rather is he making a serious and, to a degree, a successful attempt to trace more precisely the lines along which Greek philosophy was influenced by religion. And he views religion from a distinctly social angle. He says himself that he is carrying into the domain of philosophy the same principles of interpretation that Miss Harrison has employed in the study of religion in her *Themis*, published somewhat earlier in the same year in which his own book appeared. The two scholars, in fact, wrote with each other's work in view. Mr. Cornford contributed a chapter to Miss Harrison's volume and Miss Harrison helped in the revision of Mr. Cornford's book. At the base of both works lies the thought of the newer French sociologists and psychologists, Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim, and Bergson, with their emphasis on the social origin of religion.

The framework of Mr. Cornford's book is a distinction sharply drawn between two types of Greek religion and two corresponding and derived types of Greek philosophy. In religion, the Dionysiac type is set over against the Olympian; the one is collective (the *thiasos* is its essential), the other individual; the one rests upon a temporal, the other upon a spatial conception; the one practices sacrament, the other gift-sacrifice. For the one maintains that God and man are akin and that man can share in God's nature or even become one with him; the other upholds the superiority and aloofness of God and brands as insolence any least attempt to bridge the gulf that yawns between them.

In similar and corresponding contrast stand two schools of philosophy, the Italiote and the Ionian, the mystic and the scientific, the one clinging to unity at any cost, even that of refusing the evidence of the senses; the other tending toward a dead atomism, and eventually eliminating gods from the universe or relegating them to a quasi-existence of inactivity. It is the author's task to trace the influence of the two types of religion in molding the two schools of philosophical thought.

The first chapter aims to show that *Moirai*, the spatial disposition of the elemental provinces, had once been of religious significance. The sons of Zeus had arranged among themselves a spatial division of the universe and thus departmental ordering of the world had appeared in religious representation long before it found its way into philosophy. It is even antecedent to religion; it goes back to a pre-religious stage and has a distinct